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Abstract
The commonly used accumulated payoff scheme is not invariant with respect to shifts of
payoff values when applied locally in degree-inhomogeneous population structures. We
propose a suitably modified payoff scheme and we show both formally and by numerical
simulation, that it leaves the replicator dynamics invariant with respect to affine transforma-
tions of the game payoff matrix. We then show empirically that, using the modified payoff
scheme, an interesting amount of cooperation can be reached in three paradigmatic non-
cooperative two-person games in populations that are structured according to graphs that
have a marked degree inhomogeneity, similar to actual graphs found in society. The three
games are the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Hawks-Doves and the Stag-Hunt. This confirms
previous important observations that, under certain conditions, cooperation may emerge in
such network-structured populations, even though standard replicator dynamics for mixing
populations prescribes equilibria in which cooperation is totally absent in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, and it is less widespread in the other two games.
Key words: evolutionary games, replicator dynamics, complex networks, structured
populations.
PACS: 89.65.-s; 89.75.-k; 89.75.Fb
1 Introduction and Previous Work
Evolutionary game theory (EGT) is an attempt to study the conflicting objectives
among agents playing non-cooperative games by using Darwinian concepts related
to frequency-dependent selection of strategies in a population [1,2,3], instead of
positing mathematically convenient but practically unrealistic conditions of agent
rationality and common knowledge as is customary in classical game theory [4].
Two concepts play a prominent role in EGT: the first is the idea of an evolution-
arily stable strategy (ESS) and the second is the set of equations representing the
dynamical system called replicator dynamics (RD) [5]. Both concepts are related to
an ideal situation in which there are random independent encounters between pairs
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of anonymous memoryless players using a given strategy in an infinite population.
In such a situation, a strategy is said to be an ESS if a population using that strategy
cannot be invaded by a small amount of mutant players using another strategy (this
idea can be expressed in rigorous mathematical terms, see [2]). However, the ESS
concept has a static character, i.e. it can be applied only once the population has
reached a robust rest point following certain dynamics. In other words, an ESS is
restricted to the analysis of a population in which all the members play the same
strategy and the stability of the strategy is gauged against the invasion of a small
amount of individuals playing another strategy. The replicator dynamics, on the
other hand, given an initial population in which each strategy is present with some
frequency, will end up in attractor states, as a result of the preferential selection and
replication of certain strategies with respect to others. Simply stated, strategies that
do better than the average will increase their share in the population, while those
that do worse than the average will decline. The link with standard game theory is
the following: the ESSs for a game, if at least one exists, is a subset of the game-
theoretic equilibria called Nash equilibria (NE). The attractor states of the dynamics
may be fixed points, cyclical attractors, or even chaotic attractors in some situation.
However, a result of replicator dynamics guarantees that, among the rest points of
the RD, one will find the NE and thus, a fortiori, the game’s ESSs [2]. These re-
sults pertain to infinite populations under standard replicator dynamics; they are not
necessarily true when the assumptions are not the same e.g., finite populations with
local interactions and discrete time evolution, which is the case considered here.
Several problems arise in EGT when going from very large to finite, or even small
populations which are, after all, the normal state of affairs in real situations. For ex-
ample, in small populations theoretical ESS might not be reached, as first observed
by Fogel et al. [6,7] and Ficici et al. [8], and see also [9]. The method affecting the
selection step can also be a source of difference with respect to standard EGT, even
for infinite mixing populations. Recently, Ficici et al. [10] have shown that using
selection methods different from payoff proportionate selection, such as trunca-
tion, tournament or ranking leads to results that do not converge to the game theory
equilibria postulated in standard replicator dynamics. Instead, they find different
non-Nash attractors, and even cyclic and chaotic attractors.
While the population structure assumed in EGT is panmictic, i.e. any player can
be chosen to interact with any other player, it is clear that “natural” populations in
the biological, ecological, and socio-economical realms often do have a structure.
This can be the case, for instance, for territorial animals, and it is even more com-
mon in human interactions, where a given person is more likely to interact with
a “neighbor”, in the physical or relational sense, rather than with somebody else
that is more distant, physically or relationally. Accordingly, EGT concepts have
been extended to such structured populations, starting with the pioneering works
of Axelrod [11] and Nowak and May [12] who used two-dimensional grids which
are regular lattices. However, today it is becoming clear that regular lattices are
only approximations of the actual networks of interactions one finds in biology and
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society. Indeed, it has become apparent that many real networks are neither reg-
ular nor random graphs; instead, they have short diameters, like random graphs,
but much higher clustering coefficients than the latter, i.e. agents are locally more
densely connected. These networks are collectively called small-world networks
(see [13,14]). Many technological, social, and biological networks are now known
to be of this kind. Thus, research attention in EGT has recently shifted from mixing
populations, random graphs, and regular lattices towards better models of social
interaction structures [15,16,17,18].
Fogel et al. [6,7] and Ficici et al. [10,8] studied the deviations that occur in EGT
when some of the standard RD assumptions are not fully met. In this paper we
would like to address another problem which arises when using RD in network-
structured populations. In the standard setting, populations are panmictic, i.e. any
agent may interact with any other agent in the population. However, in complex
networks, players may have a widely different number of neighbors, depending
on the graph structure of the network interactions. On the other hand, panmictic
populations may be modeled as complete graphs, where each vertex (agent) has
the same number of neighbors (degree). The same is true for any regular graph,
and thus for lattices, and also, at least in a statistical sense, for Erdo¨s–Re´nyi ran-
dom graphs [19], which have a Poissonian degree distribution. In the cases where
the number of neighbors is the same for all players, after each agent has played
the game with all of its neighbors, one can either accumulate or average the pay-
off earned by a player in order to apply the replicator dynamics. Either way, the
result is the same except for a constant multiplicative factor. However, when the
degrees of agents differ widely, these two ways of calculating an agent’s payoff
give very different results, as we show in this paper. Furthermore, we show that
when using accumulated payoff, the RD is not invariant with respect to a positive
affine transformation of the payoff matrix as it is prescribed by the standard RD
theory [2]. In other words, the game depends on the particular payoff values and is
non-generic [20]. Finally, we propose another way of calculating an agent’s payoff
that both takes into account the degree inhomogeneity of the network and leaves
the RD invariant with respect to affine transformations of the payoff matrix. We
illustrate the mathematical ideas with numerical simulations of three well-known
games: the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Hawk-Dove, and the Stag-Hunt which are uni-
versal metaphors for conflicting social interactions.
In the following, we first briefly present the games used for the simulations. Next,
we give a short account of the main population graph types used in this work,
mainly for the sake of making the paper self-contained. Then we describe the par-
ticular replicator dynamics that is used on networks, followed by an analysis of the
influence of the network degree inhomogeneity on an individual’s payoff calcula-
tion. The ensuing discussion of the results of many numerical experiments should
help illuminate the theoretical points and the proposed solutions. Finally, we give
our conclusions.
3
2 Three Symmetric Games
The three representative games studied here are the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), the
Hawk-Dove (HD), and the Stag-Hunt (SH) which is also called the Snowdrift Game
or Chicken. For the sake of completeness, we briefly summarize the main features
of these games here; more detailed accounts can be found in many places, for in-
stance [11,21,22]. These games are all two-person, two-strategy, symmetric games
with the payoff bi-matrix of Table 1. In this matrix, R stands for the reward the
C D
C (R,R) (S, T )
D (T, S) (P, P )
Table 1
Generic payoff bi-matrix for the two-person, symmetric games discussed in the text.
two players receive if they both cooperate (C), P is the punishment for bilateral
defection (D), and T is the temptation, i.e. the payoff that a player receives if it
defects, while the other cooperates. In this case, the cooperator gets the sucker’s
payoff S. In the three games, the condition 2R > T + S is imposed so that mutual
cooperation is preferred over an equal probability of unilateral cooperation and de-
fection. For the PD, the payoff values are ordered numerically in the following way:
T > R > P > S. Defection is always the best rational individual choice; (D,D)
is the unique NE and also an ESS [2]. Mutual cooperation would be preferable but
it is a strongly dominated strategy.
In the Hawk-Dove game, the order of P and S is reversed yielding T > R > S >
P . Thus, in the HD when both players defect they each get the lowest payoff. (C,D)
and (D,C) are NE of the game in pure strategies, and there is a third equilibrium in
mixed strategies where strategy D is played with probability p, and strategy C with
probability 1−p, where p depends on the actual payoff values. The only ESS of the
game is the mixed strategy, while the two pure NE are not ESSs [2]. The dilemma in
this game is caused by “greed”, i.e. players have a strong incentive to “bully” their
opponent by playing D, which is harmful for both parties if the outcome produced
happens to be (D,D).
In the Stag-Hunt, the ordering is R > T > P > S, which means that mutual
cooperation (C,C) is the best outcome, Pareto-superior, and a NE. However, there
is a second NE equilibrium where both players defect (D,D) which is inferior
from the Pareto domination point of view, but it is less risky since it is safer to play
D when there is doubt about which equilibrium should be selected. From a NE
standpoint, however, they are equivalent. Here the dilemma is represented by the
fact that the socially preferable coordinated equilibrium (C,C) might be missed
for “fear” that the other player will play D instead. There is a third mixed-strategy
NE in the game, but it is commonly dismissed because of its inefficiency and also
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because it is not an ESS [2].
3 Network Types
For our purposes here, a network will be represented as an undirected graphG(V,E),
where the set of vertices V represents the agents, while the set of edges E repre-
sents their symmetric interactions. The population size N is the cardinality of V . A
neighbor of an agent i is any other agent j such that there is an edge {ij} ∈ E. The
cardinality of the set of neighbors Vi of player i is the degree ki of vertex i ∈ V .
The average degree of the network will be called k¯. An important quantity that will
be used in the following is the degree distribution function (DDF) of a graph P (k)
which gives the probability that a given node has exactly k neighbors.
To expose the technical problems and their solution, we shall investigate three main
graph population structures: regular lattices, random graphs, and scale-free graphs.
These graph types represent the typical extreme situations studied in the literature.
Regular lattices are examples of degree-homogeneous networks, i.e. all the nodes
have the same number of neighbors; they have been studied from the EGT point of
view in [12,23,24,25], among others. In random graphs the degree fluctuates around
the mean k¯ but the fluctuations are small, of the order of the standard deviation of
the associated Poisson distribution. The situation can thus be described in mean-
field terms and is similar to the standard setting of EGT, where the large mixing
population can be seen as a completely connected graph. On the other hand, scale-
free graphs are typical examples of degree-heterogeneous graphs as the degree dis-
tribution is broad (see below). For the sake of illustration, examples of these three
population network types are shown in Fig. 1. For random and scale-free graphs
only one among the many possible realizations is shown, of course.
Recent work [14] has shown that scale-free and other small-world graphs are struc-
turally and statistically much closer to actual social and biological networks and are
thus an interesting case to study. Evolutionary games on scale-free and other small-
world networks have been investigated, among others, in [15,16,17,26]. Another
interesting result for evolutionary games on networks has been recently obtained by
Ohtsuki et al. [27]. In this study the authors present a simple rule for the evolution
of cooperation on graphs based on cost/benefit ratios and the number of neigh-
bors of a given individual. This result is closely related to the subject matter of the
present work but its application in the present context will be the subject of further
study. Our main goal is to consider the global influence of network structure on the
dynamics using a particular strategy update rule. A further step toward real social
structures has been taken in [18], where some evolutionary games are studied using
model social networks and an actual coauthorship network.
The DDF of a regular graph is a normalized delta function centered at the constant
5
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Fig. 1. A regular lattice (a), a random graph (b), and a scale-free graph (c). In (c) the nodes
are shown with a size proportional to their number of neighbors.
degree k of the graph. Random graphs, which behave similar to panmictic popu-
lations, are constructed according to the standard Erdo¨s–Re´nyi [19] model: every
possible edge among the N vertices is present with probability p or is absent with
probabililty 1 − p. The DDF of such a random graph is Poissonian for N → ∞.
Thus most vertices have degrees close to the mean value k¯. In contrast, DDFs for
complex networks in general have a longer tail to the right, which means that nodes
with many neighbors may appear with non-negligible probability. An extreme ex-
ample are scale-free networks in which the DDF is a power-law P (k) ∝ k−γ .
Scale-free networks have been empirically found in many fields of technology, so-
ciety, and science [14]. To build scale-free networks, we use the model proposed by
Baraba´si and Albert [28]. In this model, networks are grown incrementally starting
with a small clique of m0 nodes. At each successive time step a new node is added
such that its m ≤ m0 edges link it to m nodes already present in the graph. It is
assumed that the probability p that a new node will be connected to node i depends
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on the current degree ki of the latter. This is called the preferential attachment rule.
The probability p(ki) of node i to be chosen is given by p(ki) = ki/
∑
j kj, where
the sum is over all nodes already in the graph. The model evolves into a stationary
network with power-law probability distribution for the vertex degree P (k) ∼ k−γ ,
with γ ∼ 3.
4 Replicator Dynamics in Networks
The local dynamics of a player i only depends on its own strategy and on the strate-
gies of the ki players in its neighborhood Vi. Let us call piij the payoff player i
receives when interacting with neighbor j. Let M be the payoff matrix correspond-
ing to the row player. Since the games used here are symmetric the corresponding
payoff matrix of the column player is simplyMT , the transpose ofM . For example,
from table 1 of section 2 one has:
M =
R S
T P
, MT =
R T
S P
,
where suitable numerical values must be replaced for R, S, T, P .
This payoff piij of the row player is now defined as
piij(t) = si(t) M s
T
j (t),
where si(t) and sTj (t) are, respectively, row and column vectors representing the
players’ mixed strategies i.e., the probability distributions over the rows or columns
played by i and j at time t. A pure strategy is the particular case in which only one
row or column is chosen. The quantity
Π̂i(t) =
∑
j∈Vi
piij(t)
is the accumulated payoff collected by player i at time step t, whereas the quantity
Πi(t) =
1
ki
Π̂i(t) is his average payoff.
Accumulated payoff seems more logical in degree-heterogeneous networks such
as scale-free graphs since it reflects the very fact that players may have different
numbers of neighbors in the network. Average payoff, on the other hand, smooths
out the possible differences although it might be justified in terms of number of
interactions that a player may sustain in a given time. For instance, an individual
with many connections is likely to interact less often with each of its neighbors than
another that has a lower number of connections. Also, if there is a cost to maintain
a relationship, average payoff will roughly capture this fact, while it will be hidden
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if one uses accumulated payoff. On the other hand, if in a network some individu-
als happen to have many more connections than the majority, this also means that
they have somehow been able to establish and maintain them; maybe this is a result
of better social skills, more opportunities or for other reasons but it is something
that is commonly observed on actual social networks. Because of this, most re-
cent papers dealing with evolutionary games on networks have used accumulated
payoff [15,16,26,29,18], and this is the main reason why we have focused on the
technical problems that this may cause in degree-heterogeneous networks.
The rule according to which agents update their strategies is the conventional RD.
The RD rule in networks aims at maximal consistency with the original evolution-
ary game theory equations and is the same as proposed by [25]. It is assumed that
the probability of switching strategy is a monotonic increasing function φ of the
payoff difference [2,3]. To update the strategy of player i, another player j is first
drawn uniformly at random from i’s neighborhood Vi. Then, strategy si is replaced
by sj with probability
pi = φ(Πj − Πi), (1)
Where Π may stand either for the above defined accumulated Π̂ or average Π pay-
offs, or for the modified accumulated payoff Π˜ to be defined below. The major dif-
ference with standard replicator dynamics is that two-person encounters between
players are only possible among neighbors, instead of being drawn from the whole
population. Other commonly used strategy update rules include imitating the best
in the neighborhood, or replicating in proportion to the payoff, meaning that each
individual i reproduces with probability pi = pii/
∑
j pij , where pii is i’s payoff
and the sum is over all i′s neighbors [25]. However, in the present work we do
not examine these alternative rules. Finally, contrary to [16], we use asynchronous
dynamics in the simulations presented here. More precisely, we use the discrete
update dynamics that makes the least assumption about the update sequence: the
next node to be updated is chosen at random with uniform probability and with
replacement. This asynchronous update is analogous to the one used by Hauert et
al. [25]. It corresponds to a binomial distribution of the updating probability and is
a good approximation of a continuous-time Poisson process. We believe that asyn-
chronous update dynamics are more likely in a system of independently interacting
agents that may act at different and possibly uncorrelated times. Furthermore, it has
been shown that asynchronous updating may give rise to steadier quasi-equilibrium
states by eliminating artificial effects caused by the nature of perfect synchronic-
ity [30]. Nevertheless, in this work, we have checked that synchronous update of
the agents’ strategies does not qualitatively change the conclusions.
4.1 Payoff Invariance
In standard evolutionary game theory one finds that replicator dynamics is invariant
under positive affine transformations of payoffs with merely a possible change of
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time scale [2]. Unfortunately, on degree-heterogenous networks, this assumption
is not satisfied when combining replicator dynamics together with accumulated
payoff. This can be seen as follows. Let pi in Eq. 1 be given by the following
expression, as defined by Santos and Pacheco [16],
pi = φ(Πj − Πi) =

Πj − Πi
dMk>
if Πj − Πi > 0
0 otherwise,
(2)
with dM = max{T,R, P, S} − min{T,R, P, S}, k> = max{ki, kj}, and Πi
(respectively Πj) the aggregated payoff of a player i (respectively j). If we set
Πx = Π̂x for all x ∈ V and now apply a positive affine transformation of the payoff
matrix, this leads to the new aggregated payoff
Π̂
′
i =
∑
j∈Vi
pi
′
ij =
∑
j∈Vi
(αpiij + β) = α
∑
j∈Vi
piij +
∑
j∈Vi
β = αΠ̂i + βki
with α > 0, β ∈ R and hence
φ(Π̂′j − Π̂′i) = (αΠ̂j + βkj − αΠ̂i − βki)/(αdMk>)
=φ(Π̂j − Π̂i) + β(kj − ki)/(αdMk>).
One can clearly see that using accumulated payoff does not lead to an invariance of
the replicator dynamics under shifts of the payoff matrix.
As for the average payoff, although it respects the replicator dynamics invariance
under positive affine transformation, it prevents nodes with many edges to have po-
tentially a higher payoff than those with only a few links. Furthermore, nodes are
extremely vulnerable to defecting neighbors with just one link.
Thus, we propose here a third definition for a player’s payoff that retains the advan-
tages of the accumulated and average payoff definitions without their drawbacks.
Let piγ denote the guaranteed minimum payoff a player can obtain in a one-shot
two-person game. This is what a player would at least receive were he to attempt
to maximize his minimum payoff. For example in the PD, a player could choose
to play C with the risk of obtaining the lowest payoff S were its opponent to play
D. However, by opting for strategy D a player would maximize its minimum pay-
off thus guaranteeing itself at least piγ = P > S no matter what its opponent’s
strategy might be. In the HD game we have piγ = S, for this time the payoff or-
dering is T > R > S > P and a player needs only to play C to receive at least
payoff S. Finally, in the SH game, piγ = P . We can now define a player i’s ag-
gregated payoff as being Π˜i =
∑
j∈Vi (piij − piγ). Intuitively, it can be viewed as
the difference between the payoff an individual collects and the minimum payoff it
would get by “playing it safe”. Our modified payoff Π˜ has the advantage of leav-
ing the RD invariant with respect to a positive affine transformation of the payoff
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matrix both on degree-homogeneous and heterogeneous graphs while still allow-
ing the degree distribution of the network to have a strong impact on the dynamics
of the game. Indeed, a player placed on a highly connected node of a graph can
benefit from its numerous interactions which enables it to potentially collect a high
payoff. However, these same players run the risk of totaling a much lower score
than a player with only a few links. One can notice that on degree-homogeneous
graphs such as lattices or complete graphs, using accumulated, average, or the new
aggregated payoff definition yields the same results. The proof of the RD invari-
ance under positive affine transformation of the payoff matrix when using this new
payoff definition is straightforward:
φ(Π˜′j − Π˜′i) =
1
αdMk>
∑
k∈Vj
(
(αpijk + β)− (αpiγ + β)
)
−∑
k∈Vi
(
(αpiik + β)− (αpiγ + β)
)
=
1
αdMk>
α ∑
k∈Vj
(pijk − piγ)
−α ∑
k∈Vi
(piik − piγ)

= (Π˜j − Π˜i)/(dMk>)
=φ(Π˜j − Π˜i).
4.2 Modified Replicator Dynamics
Let us turn our attention once again to the replicator dynamics rule (Eq.2). Dividing
the payoff difference between players j and i by dMk> might seem reasonable at
first since it does ensure that φ is a probability, i.e. has a value between 0 and 1.
Nevertheless, we don’t find it to be the adequate division to do for subtle reasons.
To illustrate our point, let us focus on the following particular case and use the
accumulated payoff to simplify the explanation.
On the one side, Fig. 2 (a) shows a cooperator C1 surrounded by three defectors
each having three cooperating neighbors. Using the replicator dynamics as defined
in Eq. 2, the probability cooperator C1 would turn into a defector, given that it is
selected to be updated, is equal to
10
(a) (b)
Fig. 2. Example
φ(Π̂j − Π̂C1) = (Π̂j − Π̂C1)/(dMk>)
= (3T − 3S)/(3dM)
= (T − S)/dM ,
and this no matter which defecting neighbor j is chosen since they all have the
same payoff. On the other side, the central cooperator C2 in Fig. 2 (b) would adopt
strategy D with probability
φ(Π̂j − Π̂C2) = (Π̂j − Π̂C2)/(dMk>)
= (3T − 6S)/6dM
= (T − 2S)/2dM ,
a value that is once again independent of the selected neighbor j. Now, if T > 0
and φ(Π̂j − Π̂C1), φ(Π̂j − Π̂C2) > 0, then C2 has a bigger chance of having its
strategy unaltered than C1 does. This last statement seems awkward since in our
opinion, the fact of being surrounded by twice as many defectors as C1 (with all
the D-neighbors being equally strong), should have a negative impact on coopera-
tor C2, making it difficult for it to maintain its strategy. To make the situation even
more evident, let us also suppose S = 0. In this case, a cooperator surrounded by
an infinite number of D-neighbors, who in turn all have a finite number of neigh-
bors, would have a zero probability of changing strategy, which is counter-intuitive.
Therefore, and with all the previous arguments in mind, we adjust Eq. 2 to define
another replicator dynamics function namely
φ(Πj − Πi) =

Πj − Πi
Πj,max − Πi,min if Πj − Πi > 0
0 otherwise,
(3)
where Πx,max (resp. Πx,min) is the maximum (resp. minimum) payoff a player x can
get. If pix,max and pix,min denote player x’s maximum and minimum payoffs in a two-
player one-shot game (pix,max = max{T,R, P, S} and pix,min = min{T,R, P, S}
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for the dilemmas studied here), we have:
• Πx,max = pix,max and Πx,min = pix,min for average payoff;
• Πx,max = kxpix,max and Πx,min = kxpix,min for accumulated payoff;
• Πx,max = kx(pix,max − pix,γ) and Πx,min = kx(pix,min − pix,γ) for the new payoff
scheme.
Finally, one can easily verify that using Πi = Π˜i as the aggregated payoff of a
player i leaves equation Eq. 3 invariant with respect to a positive affine transforma-
tion of the payoff matrix.
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Fig. 3. Amount of cooperation in the HD game using accumulated payoff on three different
network types in three different game spaces (see text). Lighter areas mean more coopera-
tion than darker ones (see scale on the right side). Left column: scale free; Middle column:
random graph; Right column: grid. Upper row: 2 ≤ T ≤ 3, R = 2, 1 ≤ S ≤ 2, P = 1;
Middle row: 1 ≤ T ≤ 2, R = 1, 0 ≤ S ≤ 1, P = 0; Bottom row: 0 ≤ T ≤ 1, R = 0,
−1 ≤ S ≤ 0, P = −1
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5 Numerical Simulations
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Fig. 4. Standard deviation for the HD using accumulated payoff on scale-free networks for
two different game spaces. (a) 1 ≤ T ≤ 2, R = 1, S = 0.1, P = 0, (b) 2 ≤ T ≤ 3, R = 2,
S = 1.1, P = 1. Note that (a) is a cut at S = 0.1 of the middle image in the leftmost
column of Fig. 3, while (b) represents a cut of the topmost image in the leftmost column of
Fig. 3 at S = 1.1.
We have simulated the PD, HD and SH described in Sect. 2 on regular lattices,
Erdo¨s–Re´nyi random graphs and Baraba´si–Albert scale-free graphs, all three of
which were presented in Sect. 3. Furthermore, in each case, we test the three payoff
schemes discussed in Sect. 4. The networks used are all of size N = 4900 with
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Fig. 5. Levels of cooperation in the HD game using the new aggregated payoff Π˜ on
scale-free graphs in three different game spaces (see text). Left: 2 ≤ T ≤ 3, R = 2,
1 ≤ S ≤ 2, P = 1; Middle: 1 ≤ T ≤ 2, R = 1, 0 ≤ S ≤ 1, P = 0; Right: 0 ≤ T ≤ 1,
R = 0, −1 ≤ S ≤ 0, P = −1.
an average degree k = 4. The regular lattices are two-dimensional with periodic
boundary conditions, and the neighborhood of an individual comprises the four
closest individuals in the north, east, south, and west directions. The Erdo¨s–Re´nyi
random graphs were generated using connection probability p = 8.16 × 10−4. Fi-
nally, the Baraba´si–Albert were constructed starting with a clique of m0 = 2 nodes
and at each time step the new incoming node has m = 2 links.
For each game, we limit our study to the variation of only two parameters per
game. In the case of the PD, we set R = 1 and S = 0, and vary 1 ≤ T ≤ 2 and
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0 ≤ P ≤ 1. For the HD, we set R = 1 and P = 0 and the two parameters are
1 ≤ T ≤ 2 and 0 ≤ S ≤ 1. Finally, in the SH, we decide to fix R = 1 and S = 0
and vary 0 ≤ T ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ P ≤ T .
We deliberately choose not to vary the same two parameters in all three games. The
reason we choose to set T and S in both the PD and the SH is to simply provide
natural bounds on the values to explore of the remaining two parameters. In the
PD case, P is limited between R = 1 and S = 0 in order to respect the ordering
of the payoffs (T > R > P > S) and T ’s upper bound is equal to 2 due to the
2R > T + S constraint. In the HD, setting R = 1 and P = 0 determines the range
of S (since this time T > R > S > P ) and gives an upper bound of 2 for T , again
due to the 2R > T + S constraint. Note however, that the only valid value pairs of
(T, S) are those that satisfy the latter constraint. Finally, in the SH, both T and P
range from S to R. Note that in this case, the only valid value pairs of (T, P ) are
those that satisfy T > P .
It is important to realize that, when using our new aggregated payoff or the average
payoff, even though we reduce our study to the variation of only two parameters
per game, we are actually exploring the entire game space. This is true owing to the
invariance of Nash equilibria and replicator dynamics under positive affine transfor-
mations of the payoff matrix [2]. As we have shown earlier and as we will confirm
numerically in the next section, this does not hold for the accumulated payoff.
Each network is randomly initialized with exactly 50% cooperators and 50% de-
fectors. In all cases, the parameters are varied between their two bounds by steps of
0.1. For each set of values, we carry out 50 runs of 15000 time steps each, using a
fresh graph realization in each run. Cooperation level is averaged over the last 1000
time steps, well after the transient equilibration period. In the figures that follow,
each point is the result of averaging over 50 runs. In the next two sections, in order
to avoid overloading this document with figures, we shall focus each time on one
of the three games, commenting on the other two along the way.
5.1 Payoff Shift
We have demonstrated that in theory, the use of accumulated payoff does not leave
the RD invariant under positive affine transformations of the payoff matrix. How-
ever, one can wonder whether in practice, such shifts of the payoff matrix translate
into significant differences in cooperation levels or are the changes just minor.
Figure 3 depicts the implications of a slight positive and negative shift of the HD
payoff matrix. As one can clearly see, the cooperation levels encountered are no-
tably different before and after the shift. As a matter of fact, when comparing be-
tween network types, scale-free graphs seem to do less well in terms of cooperation
than regular grids with a shift of −1, and not really better than random graphs with
a shift of +1. Thus, one must be extremely cautious when focusing on a rescaled
form of the payoff matrix, affirming that such a re-scaling can be done without loss
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Fig. 6. Levels of cooperation in the PD game space using three different payoff schemes
and two different network types. Left column: Accumulated Payoff; Middle column: New
Aggregated Payoff; Right column: Average Payoff. Upper row: Scale free graph; Bottom
row: Random graph. Game space: 1 ≤ T ≤ 2, R = 1, 0 ≤ P ≤ 1, S = 0.
of generality, for this is far from true when dealing with accumulated payoff.
The noisy aspect of the top two figures of the leftmost column of Fig. 3 has caught
our attention. It is essentially due to the very high standard deviation values we find
in the given settings (see Fig. 4). This observation is even more pronounced with a
shift of +1. This shows that replicator dynamics becomes relatively unstable when
using straight accumulated payoff.
We have run simulations using our payoff Π˜, on all three network types in order to
numerically validate the invariance of the RD with this payoff scheme. However,
to save space, we only show here the results obtained on scale-free graphs which
are the networks that generated the biggest differences in the accumulated payoff
case (see Fig. 3, leftmost colummn). As one can see in Fig. 5, using Π˜ does indeed
leave the RD invariant with respect to a shift of the payoff matrix. There are minor
differences between the figures, but these are simply due to statistical sampling and
roundoff errors. Finally, a shift of the payoff matrix has, as expected, no influence
at all on the general outcome when using the average payoff. We point out that the
same observations can also be made for the PD and SH cases (not shown here).
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5.2 Payoff and Network Influence on Cooperation
In this section we report results on global average cooperation levels using the three
payoff schemes for two games on scale-free and random graphs.
Figure 6 illustrates the cooperation levels reached for the PD game, in the 1 ≤ T ≤
2, R = 1, 0 ≤ P ≤ 1, S = 0 game space, on a Baraba´si–Albert scale-free and ran-
dom graphs, and when using each of the three different payoff schemes mentioned
earlier, namely Π, Π˜ and Π̂.
We immediately notice that there is a significant parameter zone for which accu-
mulated payoff (leftmost column) seems to drastically promote cooperation com-
pared to average payoff (rightmost column). This observation has already been
highlighted in some previous work [30,29], although it was done for a reduced
game space. We nevertheless include it here to situate the results obtained using
our adjusted payoff in this particular game space in comparison to those obtained
using the two other extreme payoff schemes. On both network types, Π˜ (central
column of Fig. 6) yields cooperation levels somewhat like those obtained with ac-
cumulated payoff but to a lesser degree. This is especially striking on scale-free
graphs (upper row of Fig. 6). However, we again point out that the situation shown
in the image of the upper left corner of Fig. 6 would change dramatically under a
payoff shift, as discussed in Sect. 5.1 for the HD game. The same can be observed
for the HD and SH games (see Fig. 7 for the SH case). On regular lattices, there are
as expected no differences whatsoever between the use of Π˜ over Π̂ or Π due to the
degree homogeneity of this type of network (not shown).
The primary goals of this work are to highlight the non-invariance of the RD un-
der affine transformations of the payoff matrix when using accumulated payoff,
and to propose an alternative payoff scheme without this drawback. How does the
network structure influence overall cooperation levels when this latter payoff is
chosen? Looking at the middle column of figures 6 and 7, we observe that de-
gree non-homogeneity enhances cooperation. The relatively clear separation in the
game space between strongly cooperative regimes and entirely defective ones in
the middle column of Fig. 7, which refers to the SH game, can be explained by
the existence of the two ESSs in pure strategies in this case. Similarly, the large
transition phase from full cooperation to full defect states in the HD (middle image
of Fig. 5) is due to the fact that the only ESS for this game is a mixed strategy.
Cooperation may establish and remain stable in networks thanks to the formation of
clusters of cooperators, which are tightly bound groups of players. In the scale-free
case this is easier for, as soon as a highly connected node becomes a cooperator,
if a certain number of its neighbors are cooperators as well, chances are that all
neighbors will imitate the central cooperator, which is earning a high payoff thanks
to the number of acquaintances it has. An example of such a cluster is shown in
Fig. 8 for the PD. A similar phenomenon has been found to underlie cooperation in
real social networks [18].
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Fig. 7. Cooperation levels for the SH game space using three different payoff schemes
and two different network types. Left column: Accumulated Payoff; Middle column: New
Aggregated Payoff; Right column: Average Payoff. Upper row: Scale free graph; Bottom
row: Random graph. Game space: R = 1, 0 ≤ T ≤ 1, 0 ≤ P ≤ 1, S = 0. Note that the
meaningful game space is the upper left triangle, i.e. when T ≥ P .
In order to explore the dependence of the evolutionary processes on the network
size, we have performed simulations with two other graph sizes (N = 2450 and
N = 9800) for the HD game. To save space, we do not show the figures but coop-
eration results are qualitatively very similar to those shown here for N = 4900. We
have also simulated populations with two different initial percentages of randomly
distributed cooperators: 30% and 70%; again, there are no qualitative differences
with the 50-50 case shown here.
6 Conclusions
Standard RD assumes infinite mixing populations of playing agents. Actual and
simulated populations are necessarily of finite size and show a network of ties
among agents that is not random, as postulated by the theory. In this work we
have taken the population finiteness for granted and we have focused on the graph
inhomogeneity aspects of the problem. It is a well known fact that agent cluster-
ing may provide the conditions for increased cooperation levels in games such as
those studied here. However, up to now, only regular structures such as grids had
been studied in detail, with the exception of a few investigations that have dealt with
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Fig. 8. A cluster with a majority of cooperators (triangles) with many links to a central
cooperator. Symbol size is proportional to degree. Links to other nodes of the network have
been suppressed for clarity.
small-world population structures of various kinds [15,16,17,27,18]. But most have
used an accumulated payoff scheme that makes no difference in regular graphs, but
in the other cases, it does not leave the RD invariant with respect to affine trans-
formations of the payoff matrix, which is required by evolutionary game theory.
This gives rise to results that are not generalizable to the whole game space. The
alternative of using average payoff respects invariance but is much less realistic
in degree-inhomogeneous networks that are the rule in society. Here we have pro-
posed a new payoff scheme that correctly accounts for the degree inhomogeneity of
the underlying population graph and, at the same time, is invariant with respect to
these linear transformations. Using this scheme, we have shown that, on complex
networks, cooperation may reach levels far above what would be predicted by the
standard theory for extended regions of the game’s parameter space. The emergence
of cooperation is essentially due to the progressive colonization by cooperators of
highly connected clusters in which linked cooperators that earn a high payoff mu-
tually protect themselves from exploiting defectors. This phenomenon had already
been observed to a lesser extent in populations structured as regular grids but it
is obviously stronger for scale-free graphs, where there exist a sizable number of
highly connected individuals and it is the same effect that underlies cooperation in
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actual social networks. This observation alone may account for observed increased
levels of cooperation in society without having to take into account other factors
such as reputation, belonging to a recognizable group, or repeated interactions giv-
ing rise to complex reciprocating strategies, although these factors also play a role
in the emergence of cooperation.
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